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I. INTRODUCTION
Because the res nullius, the unowned thing, is potentially the
property of whoever successfully claims it,3 the scramble to claim and
exploit resources deemed "unowned" has been a black chapter of
human history. Cherished social and human values have been tram-
pled in the rush for riches. The very idea of an "owned" versus an"unowned" resource, be it land, oil or living organisms, is, of course, a
political construct, fraught with unspoken value judgments about the
kind of use or possession worthy of that recognition.4 Throughout his-
tory, biases and prejudices have morphed judgments about the uses
sufficient to demonstrate ownership into an assessment of whose use
or possession will be dignified with the label of ownership.5 This latter
assessment, implicit in the first whenever there are competing claims
to a resource, has been wielded to systematically dispossess indige-
nous peoples around the world.6
3. The work of John Locke helped develop the legal concept of terra nullius. He wrote in
Two Treatises on Government that "whatsoever then [an individual] removes out of the state that
nature has provided ... he has mixed his labor with, and joined it to something that is his own,
and thereby makes it his property." JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT, 329 (Cam-
bridge University Press 1965) (1689). Later thinkers, including Emmerich de Vattel further de-
veloped this point in relation to indigenous peoples, proclaiming that the Indian nations
"unsettled habitation in those immense regions cannot be accounted a true and legal possession;
and the people of Europe ... were lawfully entitled to take possession of it." EMMERICH DE
VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS ch. V, § 27 (Joseph Chitty ed., 1879).
4. See Rebecca M. Bratspies, The New Discovery Doctrine: Some Thoughts on Property
Rights and Traditional Knowledge, 31 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 253 (2007).
5. In Johnson v. Mc'lntosh, a case involving two non-Indian claimants to a parcel of land,
the United States Supreme Court used this reasoning to conclude that the Piankeshaw Indians
had few if any legally recognized rights over their traditional land, and did not have the right of
general alienability. Johnson v. Mc'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 590 (1823). Assessing the
nature of possession that gives rise to ownership, the Court concluded that the Piankeshaw Indi-
ans were mere "inhabitants" rather than owners of their land. Id. at 591. Justice Marshall, writing
for the majority, relied on property theories recognized at the time to conclude that the various
Indian nations had no fee simple ownership rights to land either individually, collectively, or as a
nation, but instead held a right of mere occupancy. Id. at 588. This conclusion rested on the
proposition that the tribes did not occupy their lands in a fashion that prevented its appropria-
tion by farmers for agriculture. Id. at 590-92. Justice Marshall asserted that "[aill the proprietary
rights of civilized nations on this continent are founded on this principle." Id. at 590.
6. There is some controversy about the definition of the term "indigenous people." A con-
sensus description of the key characteristics of groups encompassed by the term can be found in
PATRICK THORNBERRY, INDIGENOUS PEOPLE AND HUMAN RIGHTS 37-40 (2002) (identifying
association with a particular place, status as original inhabitants, and identity as a distinct society
as the main elements of "indigenousness"); see also John Woodliffe, Biodiversity and Indigenous
Peoples, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE CONSERVATION OF BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY 255, 256
(Michael Bowen & Catherine Redgwell eds., 1996) (describing "a profound relationship to the
land" as the main characteristic that indigenous groups share); see also Russell Lawrence Barsh,
How Do You Patent a Landscape? The Perils of Dichotomizing Cultural and Intellectual Prop-
erty, 8 INT'L J. CULTURAL PROP. 14, 20 (1999) (asserting that land rights and knowledge are so
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As global warming reshapes the Arctic environment, we stand at
a critical moment. Environmental changes are creating new opportu-
nities to exploit hitherto unreachable mineral resources.7 The melting
of the Arctic ice means that vast reserves of oil and gas are suddenly
accessible, 8 not to mention the possibility of finally establishing the
fabled "Northwest Passage."9  In turn, these new opportunities
prompt new pressures for access from those who would profit through
exploitation of those resources. In just a few short years, the Arctic
has become a front-line in the global scramble for resources.
The Arctic is clearly not terra nullius.1° The Arctic states of Ca-
nada, the United States, Russia, Norway, and Denmark already have
long-standing, if only roughly sketched, sovereignty interests in this
territory. Sweden, Finland, and Iceland also have interests in the
broader Polar region." In addition to these national claims, the Inuit
and other Northern peoples have their own set of claims based on the
fact that they have lived and worked in this region for centuries, or
closely intertwined and that attempts to separate them are as peculiarly Western reductionism,
which views the right to use land as separable from knowledge of how to use land properly).
7. See, e.g., Anthony Browne, Melting Ice Starts Rush for Arctic Resources, TIMES ONLINE,
Jan. 28, 2006, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/article721377.ece.
8. The United States Geological Survey estimates that as-yet undiscovered Arctic oil and
gas reserves might amount to ninety billion barrels of oil, 1669 trillion cubic feet of natural gas,
and forty-four billion barrels of natural gas liquids. U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, CIRCUM-ARCTIC
RESOURCE APPRAISAL: ESTIMATES OF UNDISCOVERED OIL AND GAS NORTH OF THE ARCTIC
CIRCLE 1 (2008), available at http://pubs.usgs.gov/fs/2008/3049/fs2008-3049.pdf [hereinafter U.S.
GEOLOGICAL SURVEY].
9. See GLYN WILLIAMS, VOYAGES OF DELUSION: THE QUEST FOR THE NORTHWEST PAS-
SAGE (2003) (interesting account of the search for, and belief in, a "Northwest Passage" through-
out history).
10. I say this explicitly because ideas of terra nullius retain more traction than one might
expect. Indeed, it was only during the latter part of the twentieth century that the idea of terra
nullius was officially renounced. See Mabo v. Queensland 11 (1992) 175 C.L.R. 1 (Austl.); West-
ern Sahara, Advisory Opinion, 1975 I.C.J. 12 (Oct. 16) (unanimously rejecting the doctrine of
terra nullius and concluding that the Western Sahara at the time of Spanish 1884 colonization
was not terra nullius). By stating that the Arctic is not terra nullius I do not mean to suggest that
other assertions of terra nullius were appropriate. After the Mabo decision, Australian Prime
Minister Paul Keating was widely quoted as stating: "The lie was terra nullius- the convenient
fiction that Australia had been a land of no one. The truth was native title." See, e.g., The Native
Title Act and Wik, SWIRK, http:l/www.skwirk.com.au/p-c-.s-56_u-120_t-330_c-11371TAS/9The-
Native-Title-Act-and-Wik/Land-Rights-and-Native-Title/Changing-rights-and-freedoms-Aborig-
inal-people/SOSE-History/ (last visited Mar. 6, 2009).
11. Map of Territorial Disputes over Arctic Ocean, http://mondediplo.com/IMG/pdf/arctic.
pdf (last visited Mar. 6, 2009); see also Map of Maritime Jurisdictions and Boundaries in the
Arctic Region, http:l/www.dur.ac.uk/resources/ibrularctic.pdf (last visited Mar. 9, 2009). Russian
loans to Iceland have raised concerns that Russia views Iceland's recent banking collapse as an
opportunity to solidify its claim over Arctic resources. See, e.g., Yuri Zakhovich, Why Russia is
Bailing Out Iceland, TIME, Oct. 13, 2008, http:/www.time.comltime/worldlarticle0,8599,1849705,
00.html (last visited Mar. 9, 2009).
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millennia. 12 Nevertheless, the specter of terra nullius haunts the
Arctic.
As has happened so many times throughout history, the newly-
accessible resources are concentrated in the territories occupied, used,
and claimed by indigenous peoples. The Inuit, the Sami, the Gwich'in
and other Arctic peoples are most affected in this case. 13 The tanta-
lizing prospect of riches epitomized by reports of vast Arctic oil and
gas reserves generates the same greed that in the past often drove
society to disregard existing indigenous claims to traditional lands and
the resources within those lands. 4 We have the potential to do it dif-
ferently this time. Decisions about how to govern access to and ex-
ploitation of Arctic resources offers an historic opportunity to turn
words about indigenous rights into actions on the ground.'5 Whether
we seize that opportunity or not will tell us much about who we are as
a world community.
International law offers some portents about how the rush to ex-
ploit the Arctic might play out. Among the more auspicious are re-
cent legal developments explicitly recognizing indigenous claims to
territory and resources. For example, the General Assembly recently
adopted a Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous People, 6 which
12. See MARIANNE S. V. DOUGLAS et al., Prehistoric Inuit Whalers Affected Arctic Fresh-
water Ecosystems, 101 PROC. NAT'L ACAD. SCI. 1613, 1614 (2004) (reporting evidence of Inuit
occupation dating back at least 1,000 years); see also ROBERT McGHEE, ANCIENT PEOPLE OF
THE ARCTIC (1996) (describing 4,000 years of human occupation of the Arctic).
13. See Arctic Peoples: Indigenous Peoples at the Arctic Council, http://www.arcticpeoples.
org/ (last visited Mar. 6, 2009) (a clearinghouse of information about the peoples and cultures of
the Arctic).
14. See, e.g., GEOFFREY ROBERTSON, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY: THE STRUGGLE FOR
GLOBAL JUSTICE 163 (The New Press 1999) (describing the theory of terra nullius as a conve-
nient fiction that allowed European explorers to "discover" inhabited lands by treating the na-
tive inhabitants as if they were part of the flora and fauna). See generally JAMES ANAYA,
INDIGENOUS PEOPLES UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW (Oxford University Press 2d ed. 2004)
(1996).
15. At the United Nations Social, Humanitarian and Cultural Committee meeting in Octo-
ber, 2006, Xochitl Galvez Ruiz, Director General of the National Commission for the Develop-
ment of Indigenous Peoples of Mexico, described the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous
Peoples as "an historic opportunity to turn words into action." Press Release, General Assem-
bly, Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples Must be Adopted Without Change to
Avoid Delay, Third Committee Told, U.N. Doc. GAISHC!3855 (Oct. 16, 2006).
16. The Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples was adopted by the United Na-
tions General Assembly in 2007. GA Res 61/178, U.N. Doc. A/61/L.67/Add. 1 (Sept. 13, 2007)
[hereinafter Indigenous Rights Declaration]. The vote was 143 in favor, 4 against (Australia,
Canada, New Zealand and the United States), with 11 abstentions. This Declaration has been
described as "the most important development concerning the protection of the basic rights and
fundamental freedoms of [i]ndigenous [p]eoples." Erica-Irene A. Daes, Equality of Indigenous
Peoples Under the Auspices of the United Nations-Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous
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overwhelmingly affirms indigenous rights to the natural resources
within their traditional territories. Likewise, a series of decisions
handed down by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights,17 the
International Court of Justice,' 8 and various state Constitutional
Courts' 9 have explicitly rejected terra nullius in favor of recognizing
indigenous claims and rights.2" Thus, any decisions about the Arctic
take place against an elaborate backdrop of international and domes-
tic law detailing the rights and responsibilities attributable to the
states, vis-A-vis each other and vis-A-vis the Arctic's indigenous
inhabitants.
However, there are ominous signals on the horizon as well. Rus-
sia has rushed to plant flags2' and to send patrol boats to the Arctic
region. The United States is handing out Arctic drilling licenses with
little reserve.22 Canada's government has actively supported an in-
Peoples, 7 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 493 (1995). Erica-Irene A. Daes was the United Nations' Special
Rapporteur and Chair of the Working Group on Indigenous Populations from 1984-2002.
17. The Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tlngni Cmty. v. Nicaragua, 2001 Inter-American Ct. H. R.
(ser. C) No. 79 (Aug. 31, 2001); Mary and Carrie Dann v. United States, Case 11.140, Inter-Am.
C.H.R. Report No. 75/02, OEA/Ser.LV/II.117, doc. 1 rev. 11 (2002); Mayan Indigenous Com-
munities of the Toledo District v. Belize, Case 12.053, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 40/04,
OEA/Ser.L/V/II.122, doc. 5 (2004) (Mayan), available at http://cidh.org/annual report/2004eng/
Belize.12053eng.htm [hereinafter Toledo District].
18. Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion, 1975 I.C.J. 12 (Oct. 16).
19. Calder v. Attorney-General of British Columbia [1973] S.C.R. 313, 416 (Can.) (rejecting
the proposition that indigenous peoples had no rights that survived conquest as "wholly
wrong"); Mabo v. Queensland 11 (1992) 175 C.L.R. 1 (rejecting terra nullius as contrary to inter-
national standards and common law); Delgamuukw v. British Columbia, [1997] 3. S.C.R. 1010
(Can.); Sagong Bin Tasi & Ors v. Kerajaan Negeri Selangor & Ors, [2002] 2 M.L.J. 591 (relying
on Mabo to reject terra nullius); Cal v. Attorney General, Claim No. 171 of 2007, Judgment, Oct.
18, 2007 (relying on Mabo, Delgamuukw, and the Indigenous Rights Declaration), available at
http://www.law.arizona.edu/depts/iplp/advocacy/maya-belize.
20. There is a complex interrelationship between assertions of indigenous sovereignty and
of property rights. See ANAYA, supra note 14 (explaining this interrelationship in greater depth);
Michael Asch, From Terra Nullius to Affirmation: Reconciling Aboriginal Rights With the Cana-
dian Constitution, 17 CAN. J. L. & Soc. 23 (2002).
21. See Struck, supra note 2.
22. On February 6, 2008, the Department of the Interior Minerals Management Service
auctioned off oil and gas exploration licenses for 29.4 million acres in the Chukchi Sea. The lease
area lies twenty-five miles off the north-western coast of Alaska, and is thought to contain fif-
teen million barrels of recoverable oil and seventy-six trillion cubic feet of natural gas. See MIN-
ERALS MANAGEMENT SERVICE, OCS FIVE-YEAR OIL AND GAS LEASING PROGRAM (2007),
http://www.mms.gov/ooc/PDFs/FactSheet-OCS5-YearProgram.pdf (last visited Mar. 9, 2009).
The area in question is also an environmentally sensitive habitat of Arctic polar bears. The lease
sale came as the Department of Interior simultaneously delayed listing of the polar bear as an
endangered species under the Endangered Species Act which might have prevented the sale
because the exploration will negatively impact sensitive polar bear habitat.
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creased Canadian military presence in the Arctic,23 and Parliament
has allocated money for three new military icebreakers.24 Canada and
Denmark have repeatedly jostled over conflicting claims to the tiny,
uninhabited Hans Island near northwestern Greenland. 25 These devel-
opments call into question whether international legal progress recog-
nizing indigenous rights will really make a difference in the Arctic.
What value is the developing human rights jurisprudence if it does not
translate into a better, more just, more environmentally responsible
process for deciding the fate of Arctic resources?
II. SOME BACKGROUND ABOUT THE ARCTIC
A. Place and Space
Three-quarters of the way through the International Polar Year 26
seems an auspicious moment to reflect on the basic physical changes
that are taking place in the Arctic.27 These changes have sovereignty
implications in addition to their more visible effects on the Arctic en-
vironment and the global climate.
In its Fall 2007 Synthesis Report, the Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change ("IPCC") 28 stated that "warming of the climate sys-
23. In the summer of 2008, both Prime Minister Harper and Defense Minister Peter Mac-
Kay made high profile tours of the Arctic intended to underscore Canada's sovereignty claims.
As part of Operation Nanook, MacKay visited Ellesmere Island, where he vowed that the Arctic
"presence of Canadian Forces is increasingly important to not just claim our sovereignty but ex-
ert it." Capers and Capabilities: While Canadian Leaders Talk About Arctic Sovereignty, Vessels
from Other Nations Cut Through Arctic Waters, CAN.-AM. STRATEGIC REV., Aug. 29, 2008, http:/
/www.casr.ca/as-arctic-sovereignty-capabilities-l.htm. Around the same time, Harper asserted
"to protect the North, we must control the North." Id.
24. Responding to United States criticism of these moves, Prime Minister Stephen Harper
commented: "I've been very clear that we have significant plans for national defence and for
defence of our sovereignty, including Arctic sovereignty." Browne, supra note 7.
25. It is the island's strategic location that attracts the attention of these two states. See
Christopher Stevenson, Hans Off': The Struggle for Hans Island and the Potential Ramifications
for International Border Dispute Resolution, 30 B. C. INT'L & CoMP. L. REV. 263 (2007) (describ-
ing the conflict between Canada and Denmark); see Alexander Rubin, Hands off Hans Island,
CANADA FREE PRESS, July 27, 2005, http://www.canadafreepress.com/2005/rubinO72705.htm (last
visited Mar. 6, 2009) (explaining the nationalism roused by this tiny uninhabited island).
26. The International Polar Year was designated by the National Snow and Ice Data Center
to promote the study of polar ice. National Snow and Ice Data Center, http://nsidc.org/ipy/ (last
visited Mar. 6, 2009).
27. See, e.g., Andrew C. Revkin, Arctic Melt Unnerves the Experts, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 2, 2007,
at F1, F4.
28. The IPCC was set up in 1988 by the World Meteorological Organization and the United
Nations Environmental project. At regular intervals, the IPCC produces assessment reports in
order to provide decision makers with a reliable source of climate change information. Wide-
spread participation has been a hallmark of the IPCC reports, with hundreds of experts from
around the world, including scientists, policy-makers, and government officials, participating in
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tem is unequivocal., 29 And, despite some Tobacco Institute-like3"
strategic denials,31 the evidence is indeed overwhelming. Twelve of the
warmest years on record have occurred between 1995 and 2007.32
Overall, the temperatures recorded in the Northern Hemisphere over
the last fifty years have been higher than at any time in the past mil-
lennium.33 And, things are expected to get warmer. While our under-
standing of climate change is still evolving, there is a growing body of
evidence that the rate of change is accelerating.34
The Arctic is particularly vulnerable to the effects of climate
change. And, because of the key role the Arctic plays in global cli-
mate, changes in the Arctic will reverberate around the globe. In par-
the drafting and preparation of each report. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, http:/
/www.ipcc.chl (last visited Mar. 6, 2009) (documents, reports, workshops, and other materials
generated by the IPCC). The IPCC shared the 2007 Nobel Peace Prize with former Vice Presi-
dent Al Gore. The Nobel Peace Prize, Nobel Peace Prize 2007, http://nobelpeaceprize.org/en-
GB/laureates/laureates-2007 (last visited Mar. 6, 2007). In 2007, the IPCC released its Fourth
Assessment Report, which consisted of a Synthesis Report and three Working Group Reports: 1)
The Physical Science Basis; II) Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability; and III) Mitigation. In-
tergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, http://www.ipcc.ch/ipccreports/assessments-reports.
htm (last visited Mar. 6, 2009).
29. INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: SYNTHE-
SIS REPORT 30, available at http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/syr/ar4-syr.pdf.
30. A main purpose of the Tobacco Institute was to maintain controversy over the health
effects of smoking. See, e.g., K. Michael Cummings, Anthony Brown, & Richard O'Conner, The
Cigarette Controversy, 16(6) CANCER EPIDEMIOLOGY BIOMARKERS & PREVENTION 1070,
1070-76 (2007); Charles Powers, Scientific Witness Program, Comments at The Tobacco Institute
Executive Committee Meeting (Feb. 23, 1989), available at http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/
ylk40cOO/pdf;jsessionid=5E940E96B57FB6FEF235B1EA5B6218BA (an example of the Tobacco
Institute's strategy). This document, like many other Tobacco Institute internal documents, was
made public as part of the 1998 Master Settlement Agreement of the class action lawsuit brought
by National Association of Attorneys General, and is available online at http://www.tobaccoin-
stitute.com/.
31. An example of this kind of so-called climate change skepticism is Richard Lindzen.
Richard Lindzen, Climate of Fear, WALL ST. J., Apr. 12, 2006, at A14, available at http://www.
opinionjournal.com/extra/?id=110008220. The Union of Concerned Scientists documented the
role of the petroleum industry in manufacturing and perpetuating these views. UNION OF CON-
CERNED SCIENTISTS, SMOKE, MIRRORS & HOT AIR: How EXXON MOBIL USES BIG TOBACCO'S
TACTICS TO "MANUFACTURE UNCERTAINTY" ON CLIMATE CHANGE 1 (2007), available at http://
www.ucsusa.org/assets/documents/global warming/exxon-report.pdf.
32. SYNTHESIS REPORT, supra note 29, at 30. The data in the report were for 1995-2006, but
2007 was the warmest year on record for land temperatures and the ninth warmest for water
temperatures. NATIONAL CLIMACTIC DATA CENTER, CLIMATE OF 2007-IN HISTORICAL PER-
SPECTIVE: ANNUAL REPORT (2008), http://lwf.ncdc.noaa.gov/oa/climate/research/2007/ann/ann
07.html. Additionally, 2008 seems likely to make the list of Yearly Temperature Top 10. See,
e.g., Robert Lee Holtz, The Warming Earth Blows Hot, Cold and Chaotic, WALL ST. J. ONLINE,
Jan. 2, 2009, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123085070980447477.html (reporting that 2008 was
the coolest year of the 21st century, but probably still one of the ten warmest ever recorded).
33. SYNTHESIS REPORT, supra note 29 at 30.
34. See, e.g., Holtz, supra note 32.
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ticular, the Arctic Ocean plays an important role in moderating the
global climate. Historically, the Arctic Ocean was frozen solid with
sea ice for most of the year. This situation kept the region cool, and
inaccessible. Over the past thirty years, however, both the thickness
and extent of sea ice in the Arctic have declined markedly.35 The con-
sequences from this loss of sea ice may be catastrophic. Because Arc-
tic sea ice has a bright white surface, the vast majority of sunlight
striking the ice is reflected back into space. When the sea ice melts,
more of the darker ocean surface is exposed to sunlight.36 Rather
than reflecting sunlight back into space, the darker ocean surface ab-
sorbs the majority of that sunlight.37 Thus, melting sea ice creates an
unfortunate feedback loop: the more the sea ice melts, the more the
exposed ocean surface absorbs sunlight and warms, thus further melt-
ing the sea ice and exposing more ocean surface to sunlight.
Evidence of this feedback loop is already accumulating. Satellite
data over the past thirty years document that the Arctic sea ice cover-
age has shrunk by an average of 2.7% per decade, with larger average
decreases during the summer months.38 In September 2007, Arctic
sea ice reached the lowest level ever recorded-a mere 61% of its
average extent, as measured from 1979 through 2000.39 In September
2008, the sea ice extent was 66% of the long-term average, only
slightly better than the 2007 record low. This most recent data
strongly reinforce the conclusion that we are witnessing a thirty-plus
year downward trend in Arctic ice extent.4"
At the same time, average Arctic temperatures have increased at
almost twice the global average over the past few decades. 41 As a re-
sult, the 2004 Arctic Climate Impact Assessment ("ACIA") deter-
mined that the Arctic ice is melting so rapidly that half of it could be
35. SYNTHESIS REPORT, supra note 29, at 30; see also Nat'l Snow and Ice Data Ctr., State of
the Cryosphere: Is the Cryosphere Sending Messages About Climate Change?, http://www.nsidc.
org/sotc/sea-ice.html (providing graphs, maps and charts documenting this phenomenon).
36. See ARCTIC CLIMATE IMPACT ASSESSMENT, IMPACTS OF A WARMING ARCTIC 34-35
(2004) [hereinafter ACIA ASSESSMENT] (a detailed description of this phenomenon, complete
with diagrams).
37. Press Release, Nat'l Snow and Ice Data Ctr., Sea Ice Decline Intensifies (Sept. 28,
2005), http://www.nsidc.org/news/press/20050928-trendscontinue.html.
38. SYrNHESIS REPORT, supra note 29, at 30.
39. Press Release, Nat'l Snow and Ice Data Ctr., Arctic Sea Ice Shatters All Previous Re-
cord Lows (Oct. 1, 2007), http://www.nsidc.org/news/press/2007_seaiceminimum/20071001-press-
release.html.
40. Press Release, Nat'l Snow and Ice Data Ctr., Arctic Sea Ice Down to Second-Lowest
Extent: Likely Record Low Volume (Oct. 2, 2008), http://nsidc.org/news/press/20081002-seaice_
pressrelease.html.
41. Id.; see also ACIA ASSESSMENT, supra note 36, at 8.
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gone by the end of the century.42 The 2007 IPCC Synthesis Report
and the World Wildlife Fund's 2008 update of the ACIA suggest that
this estimate may have been optimistic.43 NASA now estimates that
Arctic sea ice could be entirely gone by the end of this century.44
The Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel
on Climate Change confirmed that these changes to the global climate
are "very likely" (meaning 90% certainty) human-made.45 Indeed,
George Newton, chairman of the United States Arctic Research Com-
mission, acknowledged as much at the 2006 Davos meeting when he
advised that Arctic temperatures were expected to rise 41'F (5.5°C)
over the next century.46 Although the numbers he proposed sound
frightening, they are entirely consistent with ongoing observations of a
warming Arctic.
Despite having contributed very little to the drivers of climate
change, the Arctic's indigenous peoples feel many of its effects first
and most acutely.47 As noted above, the loss of sea ice not only warms
the Arctic, but it also has the potential to accelerate global warming
trends and to change climate patterns. These environmental changes
pose a direct threat to the lives and livelihoods of the Arctic's indige-
nous peoples. Their villages are subsiding, 48 and their culture is
42. ACIA ASSESSMENT, supra note 36, at 30.
43. WORLD WILDLIFE FUND FOR NATURE, ARCTIC CLIMATE IMPACT SCIENCE-AN UPDATE
SINCE ACIA 2 (Martin Sommerkorn & Neil Hamilton eds., 2008) (reporting that changes to the
Arctic from climate change are occurring much faster than predicted in ACIA or the IPCC),
available at http://assets.panda.orgldownloads/arctic climate_impact.scienceil.pdf.
44. NASA, The Arctic Perennial Sea Ice Could Be Gone by End of the Century, Oct., 23,
2003, http://www.nasa.gov/vision/earth/environment/PerrenialSeaIce.html.
45. INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: THE
PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS 3 (Susan Solomon et al. eds., 2007), available at http://www.ipcc.ch/
ipccreports/ar4-wgl.htm.
46. See Browne, supra note 7.
47. It was this disconnect between responsibility and costs that prompted the Inuit Petition
at the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. The effects of global warming, although
felt first in the Arctic, will not be confined there. Coastal dwellers around the world will soon
face similar threats, and almost 40% of the people on earth live within 100 km of the coast. See
The World Resources Ctr., EarthTrends, http://earthtrends.wri.org/searchabledb/index.php?
step=countries&ccID%5B%5D=0&theme=l&variableID=63&action=select-years (last visited
Mar.9, 2009) (relying on data from Columbia University's Center for International Earth Sci-
ence Information Network ("CIESIN")); Population, Landscape and Climate Estimates of the
World provided by the Socioeconomic Data and Applications Center, http://sedac.ciesin.colum-
bia.edu/place/ (last visited Mar. 9, 2009). Small island states are particularly vulnerable.
48. The permafrost is thawing as the Arctic warms. This places the villages, buildings, roads,
and pipelines built on top of the permafrost in serious jeopardy. See PERMAFROST TASK FORCE,
U.S. ARcIc RESEARCH COMM'N, CLIMATE CHANGE, PERMAFROST, AND IMPACTS ON CIVIL
INFRASTRUCTURE 8 (2003), available at www.arctic.gov/files/PermafrostForWeb.pdf. Many are
becoming uninhabitable. See, e.g., William Yardley, Victim of Climate Change, a Town Seeks a
Lifeline, N.Y. TIMES, May 27, 2007, § 1, at 1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/27/us/
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threatened-not only by loss of the ice itself, but also by the environ-
mental and cultural consequences that flow from the loss of ice-
thawing permafrost, changing conditions, and threatened animal
populations.49 These changes from global warming create crisis condi-
tions for Arctic peoples. As a result, the Arctic Climate Impact As-
sessment concluded that "climate change could have potentially
devastating impacts on the Arctic and on the peoples who live there,
particularly those indigenous peoples whose livelihoods and cultures
are inextricably linked to the Arctic environment and its wildlife."50
Global warming also creates more insidious threats to indigenous
cultures, in the form of an influx of people attracted by newly accessi-
ble Arctic resources. The United States Geological Survey estimates
that up to one quarter of the world's undiscovered oil and gas lies in
the Arctic.51 Retreating sea ice makes extracting those resources more
feasible and attractive. It also makes navigation of the Northwest Pas-
sage a real possibility, with the attendant increased risks of oil spills.52
Climate change also jeopardizes the survival of many living polar
resources including: fish, marine mammals and other wildlife, and
Arctic flora.53 Climate change not only threatens these animals by de-
stabilizing the Arctic ecosystems on which they depend, but also
threatens them indirectly by facilitating increased access by new actors
27newtok.html (describing the plight of Newtok, an Alaskan Inuit village). At the same time,
receding sea ice threatens many Arctic villages with massive erosion. See Tricia McDermott,
Global Warming Imperils Alaskan Village, CBS NEWS, August 22, 2006, http://www.cbsnews.
com/stories/2006/08122/eveningnews/main1926055.shtml (last visited Mar. 9, 2009) (describing
the devastation climate change and loss of sea ice are already causing in Shishmaref Alaska).
The costs associated with relocating entire Arctic villages are exorbitant. See McDermott, supra
(reporting an estimated cost of $180 million (U.S.) to move Shishmaref); see also, Yardley, supra
(reporting an estimated cost $130 million (U.S.) to move Newtok, a village of 315). Alaska has
so far invested $13 million (U.S.) to protect at least 400 such villages. Alaska Spending Millions
to Relocate Villages Affected by Climate Change, Fox NEWS, June 13, 2008, http://wwwfoxnews.
comstory/0,2933,366289,00.html (last visited Mar. 9, 2009).
49. See ACIA ASSESSMENT, supra note 36, at 16-17; see also Hari M. Osofsky, A Right to
Frozen Water? The Institutional Space for Supranational Climate Change Petitions, in PROGRESS
IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 749, 749 (Russell A. Miller & Rebecca M. Bratspies eds., Martinus
Nijhoff Publishers 2008) [hereinafter A Right to Frozen Water?].
50. ARCTIC CLIMATE IMPACT ASSESSMENT, Scientific Report 659 (Cambridge Univ. Press
2005), available at http://www.acia.uaf.edu [hereinafter SCIENTIFIC REPORT].
51. U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, supra note 8 (estimating the undiscovered reserves at
ninety billion barrels of oil, 1,669 trillion cubic feet of natural gas, and forty-four billion barrels
of natural gas liquids).
52. See ACIA ASSESSMENT, supra note 36, at 82-84.
53. Id. at 58-65, 70-73 (describing effects on, inter alia, polar bear, seals, walruses, and
caribou). This framing is not intended to suggest that the threatened Arctic species have value
only when viewed through the lens of human exploitation.
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seeking to exploit them for profit.54 The effect on the Arctic's indige-
nous peoples, who depend on these animals for food and for cultural
survival, will be devastating.55
B. Sovereignty and People
The unforgiving nature of the Arctic's terrain had historically lim-
ited the degree of outside interest and activity in the Arctic. Global
warming is changing that. Disputes are already erupting over largely
undefined boundaries and unexploited resources.5 6 So we have ques-
tions. How will governments and international agencies confront the
massive challenges posed by global warming? Will they ensure that
indigenous Arctic peoples have a seat at the table as decisions are
made about new patterns of development and settlement? Will indig-
enous cultural concerns be given due consideration in any plans for
resettlement as global warming renders existing Arctic communities
unsafe? 7 Will governments help traditional cultures adapt to the new
economic systems and social pressures brought on by the rush to ex-
ploit Arctic resources? Who will determine the environmental values
and protections for Arctic ecosystems? To begin to answer these ques-
tions, we must turn to the elaborate network of international law that
details the rights and responsibilities Arctic states bear, not only vis-A-
54. Id. at 92-96.
55. See Adaptation Workshop, September 20-21, ARCTIC PEOPLES, OCT. 16, 2008, http://
www.arcticpeoples.org/ (last visited Mar. 9, 2009). Bill Erasmus, International Chairperson of
the Arctic Athabaskan Council described the gravity of the situation at a September 2008 Arctic
Council meeting on adaptation: "Copenhagen-Representatives of Indigenous Peoples from
across the Arctic are calling on governments to work with them in tackling the 'catastrophic'
effects of Climate Change." Bill Erasmus, representing the Arctic Athabaskan Council in Ca-
nada, called the situation a "crisis" at a meeting of circumpolar Arctic indigenous peoples over
the weekend. Erasmus further explained,
The permafrost is melting, homes are destroyed, rivers are rising, lakes are disappear-
ing, migratory patterns are changing, [and] seasons are not the same anymore. ...
Reindeer herders face the loss of herds, hunters face starvation, trappers are dying
because they cannot read ice conditions anymore. People are losing their homes and
their lives. Entire communities of [i]ndigenous [p]eoples are at risk across the Arctic. I
think use of the word "crisis" is appropriate.
Id.
56. Of course, the Arctic's indigenous peoples consider the existing borders to be "artificial
boundaries." See, e.g., Aqqaluk Lynge, President, Inuit Circumpolar Conference, Address to
Smithsonian Institution's Greenland Week (May 21, 2005) (transcript available at http://www.
channel6.dk/icc/GreenlandersAreInuitFINAL.doc). They are likely to feel the same way
about any new boundaries drawn under the Law of the Sea Convention. Id.
57. In addition to the citizens of Newtok and Shishmaref, see supra note 48, other Arctic
communities are also threatened by these changes. See ACIA ASSESSMENT, supra note 36, at
79-81. Indeed, at least one nuclear reactor may be in jeopardy, as well as significant Arctic
populations. See SCIENTIFIc REPORT, supra note 50, at 908-27.
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vis each other in the Arctic, but also the Arctic's indigenous peoples.
The exploration begins with the very idea of sovereignty in the Arctic.
Sovereignty claims in the Arctic relate to both the terrestrial and
submerged lands. Both sets of claims raised unique questions for in-
ternational law, which had traditionally recognized sovereignty based
on actual occupation under a claim of sovereign control.58 Most of the
existing assertions of sovereignty over the terrestrial lands of the Arc-
tic would not meet this test. Among the most desolate and sparsely
populated regions in the world, the United Nations Environmental
Programme estimates a total global Arctic population of about four
million, 9 spread across more than 16,700 sq. km of land.6" Almost
half of that population lives in the Russian Federation.61 With the
exception of Greenland and Northern Canada, indigenous peoples are
in the overall minority in the Arctic, though they typically form major-
ities in many local communities.62
Claims over terrestrial lands of the Arctic are a product of the
same messy system that "governed" such claims around the world.
These claims ultimately rest on the same principle of terra nullius used
to deprive indigenous peoples of their traditional land rights, but be-
cause the Arctic was such an inhospitable place, many of these sover-
eignty claims rest on symbolic rather than actual occupation. Thus, the
self-proclaimed sovereigns often rested their sovereignty claims on far
more tenuous manifestations of a permanent presence in this terri-
tory, than that of the indigenous groups they purported to supplant.
Thus we see oddities like Ellesmere Island which was, for a time, in-
habited wholly by policemen, 63 or Shackleton claiming symbolic pos-
58. Seokwoo Lee, Continuing Relevance of Traditional Modes of Territorial Acquisition in
International Law and a Modest Proposal, 16 CONN. J. INT'L L. 1, 2-8 (2000) (providing an
overview).
59. See United Nations Environment Program, Population distribution in the circumpolar
Arctic, by country (including indigenous population) (2008), http://maps.grida.no/go/graphic/
population-distribution-in-the-circumpolar-arctic-by-country-incuding-indigenous-populationI
(last visited Mar. 6, 2009) [hereinafter Population distribution] (map of population distribution);
see also ACIA ASSESSMENT, supra note 36, at 6.
60. THE ARCric: ENVIRONMENT, PEOPLE, POLICY 467 (Mark Nuttall & Terry V. Callaghan
eds., Hardwood Academic Publishers 2000) (providing detailed, albeit dated population break-
downs for various Arctic countries and regions).
61. See Population distribution, supra note 59.
62. If the Russian Federation, where the overwhelming majority of Arctic residents are not
indigenous, and Iceland, which has no indigenous population, are excluded, the numbers are
much closer between indigenous and non-indigenous inhabitants.
63. F. M. Auburn, The White Desert, 19 INT'L & COMP. L. Q. 229, 235 (1970).
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session of the Polar Plateau by hoisting flags and burying a brass
cylinder containing stamps and documents.64
Regardless of convolutions intended to bolster sovereignty
claims, the land, at all times, remained used and occupied by its origi-
nal inhabitants-the Inuit, Aleuts, Sami, and the other peoples of the
north. However, as indigenous peoples had experienced elsewhere,
their claims to their land were shunted aside as states jostled for con-
trol over Arctic territories. For example, when the United States"purchased" the territory of Alaska from Russia in 1867, it expressly
upheld the pre-existing Russian grants of land to colonists as part of
the purchase, but took no position on the question of "native rights." 65
Eventually, an Act of Congress confirmed some land rights for the
Inuit people, but only for the lands they actually occupied.66 In direct
contradiction to how the Inuit actually used their lands, the Act ac-
corded the Inuit no rights to their traditional lands apart from those
occupied in the Western sense of the word.
The United States was not alone in dismissing indigenous rights
in the Arctic. Denmark refused to acknowledge any legal effect of
traditional indigenous communal land ownership and therefore con-
sidered the entirety of Greenland to be res nullius.67 Canada has a
similarly troubled history with recognizing that the traditional land
use patterns of its First Nations gave rise to property rights.68 Now, of
course, it is those very same traditional uses of Arctic lands that un-
dergird expansive state claims of sovereignty in the region.69 The
irony of this situation passes largely unremarked.
64. 2 WILLIAM JAMES MILLS, EXPLORING POLAR FRONTIERS 596-97 (2003).
65. For a fascinating contemporaneous account of these events, see Ted. C. Hinkley ed.,
"The Canoe Rocks-We Do Not Know What Will Become of Us": The Complete Transcript of a
Meeting between Governor John Green Brady of Alaska and a Group of Tlingit Chiefs, Juneau,
Dec. 15, 1898, 1 W. HIST. Q. 265, 270-77 (1970).
66. Act to Repeal Timber Culture Laws of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 561, §§ 12, 14, 26 Stat. 1095,
1100 (1891).
67. Alexa Woodward, The Search for a Legal Identity in Greenland: To Be or Not To Be
Indigenous (unpublished manuscript, on file with author). Although most of the land in Green-
land was not suitable for agriculture, this policy did have significant ramifications for exploita-
tion of mineral resources. See Robert Peterson, Colonialism as Seen From a Formerly Colonized
Area, 32 ARCTIC ANTHROPOLOGY 118, 118-26 (1995), available at http://arcticcircle.uconn.edu/
HistoryCulture/petersen.html.
68. See, e.g., Kent McNeil, The Vulnerability of Indigenous Land Rights in Australia and
Canada, 42 OSGOODE HALL L. J. 271, 286-94 (2004); Jennifer A. Hamilton, Resettling Mus-
queam Park: Property, Landscape and "Indian Land" in British Columbia, 29 POLAR 88, 93-95
(2006) (providing an overview).
69. For example, in what has become known as the "use it or lose it" speech, Canadian
Prime Minister Stephen Harper called the Arctic "central to [their] identity as a northern na-
tion." Press Release, Prime Minister Stephen Harper, Prime Minister Stephen Harper An-
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While state claims over Arctic terrestrial land may bend tradi-
tional criteria for sovereignty, the submerged lands of the continental
shelf poses an even more fundamental dilemma-if sovereignty rests
on occupation, either actual or symbolic, how can states assert sover-
eignty at all. These lands are inaccessible for most of the traditional
signifiers of sovereignty-nobody could live there, or indeed even
visit. Thus, in applying concepts of sovereignty to the continental
shelf on the basis of contacts far less than those found inadequate to
establish either sovereignty or ownership in Johnson v. Mc'Intosh and
its progeny, international law demonstrates just how elastic the con-
cept of sovereignty can be in the hands of determined and powerful
interests. 70 It was, after all, the novelty of the action and the message
it conveyed about national intent, rather than any attendant legal con-
sequences, which made the Russian decision to plant a flag on the
seabed into international news.
The legal regime for the submerged lands of the continental shelf
is of relatively recent vintage. Buried under hundreds of feet of water,
and therefore inaccessible, the very idea of "sovereignty" over most of
the continental shelf was for centuries a wholly academic idea-of in-
terest, perhaps, but of little practical importance. Sonar and other
technologies developed at the end of World War II changed all that,
bringing the submerged lands of the continental shelf within reach of
human exploration. Subsequently, oil deposits were discovered, and
suddenly sovereign boundaries on the continental shelf were of great
national consequence.
In 1945, President Truman issued a Presidential Proclamation as-
serting U.S. sovereignty over the continental shelf surrounding the
United States.71 Other nations soon followed suit.72 Conflicting
claims proliferated. Academic musings about the nature of sover-
founces New Arctic Offshore Patrol Ships (July 9, 2007), available at http://pm.gc.ca/eng/
media.asp?id=1742. The population of Nunavut, Canada's northernmost province, is 85% Inuit.
Jack Hicks & Graham White, Nunavut: lnuit Self-Determination Through a Land Claim and
Public Government, in THE PROVINCIAL STATE IN CANADA: POLITICS IN THE PROVINCES AND
TERRITORIES 389 (Keith Brownsey & Michael Howlett eds., 2001). Similarly, Denmark's Arctic
claims rest entirely on its control over Greenland.
70. See Peter Manis, Sovereignty, Self-Determination and Environment Based Cultures: The
Emerging Voice of Indigenous Peoples in International Law, 23 Wis. INT'L L. J. 553, 559 (2005)
(characterizing sovereignty as a highly elastic concept).
71. POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES WITH RESPECT TO THE NATURAL RESOURCES OF THE
SUBSOIL AND SEA BED OF THE CONTINENTAL SHELF, PRESIDENTIAL PROCLAMATION No. 2667,
10 FED. REG. 12,303 (SEPT. 28, 1945), available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?
pid=12332.
72. See Rebecca M. Bratspies, Finessing King Neptune: Fisheries Management and the Lim-
its of International Law, 25 HARV. ENVT'L L. REV. 213, 220 (2001).
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eignty ran headlong into realpolitik. There were valuable resources on
the continental shelf, and states were eager to assert the sovereign
right to exploit them. The legal constructs that had kept the oceans as
mare liberum for centuries would not answer for oil extraction. In-
deed, the 1969 North Sea Continental Shelf Cases73 proceeded on the
assumption that claims by the contiguous state to sovereignty over the
continental shelf were valid even without "occupation, effective or no-
tational, or any express proclamation."74 The Law of the Sea Conven-
tion ("UNCLOS") codified this jurisprudential assumption in Article
77:
1. The coastal State exercises over the continental shelf sovereign
rights for the purpose of exploring it and exploiting its natural
resources.
3. The rights of the coastal State over the continental shelf do not
depend on occupation, effective or notional, or on any express
proclamation. 75
Of course, coastal geography meant that many states would have
overlapping or conflicting claims. And, indeed, many such disputes
had already been resolved by the time UNCLOS came into force in
1994.76 The same is true in the Arctic. For the historically accessible
portions of the Arctic, many conflicting continental shelf claims have
already been resolved.77 However, with climate change making more
of the Arctic accessible, states are looking to extend their existing
claims or to assert entirely new claims to the continental shelf and its
resources.
III. A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF THE RELEVANT LAW OF THE SEA
PROVISIONS
The sovereignty claims asserted over the submerged lands of the
Arctic Ocean's Continental shelf can be managed in a relatively or-
73. North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (F.R.G. v. Den., F.R.G. v. Neth.) 1969 I.C.J. 3 (Feb.
20).
74. Id. at 172 (Tanaka, J., dissenting) (quoting Geneva Convention art. 2(3), Apr. 29, 1958,
499 U.N.T.S. 311).
75. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea art. 77, Dec. 10, 1982, 21 I.L.M. 1261
[hereinafter UNCLOS].
76. For a discussion of the various ways that these boundaries were resolved, including di-
rect negotiation, mediation, and ICJ decision, see Robin R. Churchill, The Role of the ICJ in
Maritime Boundary Delimitation, in OCEAN MANAGEMENT IN THE 21ST CENTURY: INSTITU-
TIONAL FRAMEWORKS AND RESPONSES 125, 125-42 (A.G. Oude Efferinck & D. R. Rothwell
eds., 2004).
77. See Map of Established Maritime Boundaries in the Arctic Region, http://www.icefloe.
netlimages/ArcticRegion.pdf (last visited Mar. 6, 2009) (compiling a list of the already deline-
ated maritime boundaries between various states with Arctic pretensions).
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derly fashion because they all arose around the same time, are based
on the same legal principles, and raise the same legal questions. UN-
CLOS Article 76 creates a regime for resolving conflicting sovereignty
claims to submerged Arctic lands. 78 This provision defines the outer
limits of a country's shelf as the "natural" extension of the land mass
either to the outer edge of the continental margin or to 320 kilometers
from the coast.79 Annex II gives states up to ten years after their ratifi-
cation of the treaty to map out their claims to the Arctic seabed and
continental shelf.8" These claims are then submitted to the Commis-
sion on the Limits of the Continental Shelf which is tasked with ap-
proving and reconciling the claims.8 Annex II of UNCLOS lays out
the composition and functions of this Continental Shelf Commission.82
As parties to UNCLOS, the Arctic coastal states of Russia, Ca-
nada, Denmark and Norway have either already submitted, or are
preparing to submit, proposed outer limits for their continental
shelves under this part of the UNCLOS treaty.83 If and when the
United States becomes a party to the UNCLOS treaty, it will presum-
ably submit a similar set of claims. Because UNCLOS contemplates
78. UNCLOS, supra note 75.
79. Id.
80. UNCLOS, supra note 75, Annex II, art. 4. UNCLOS Article 4 states:
Where a coastal State intends to establish, in accordance with article 76, the outer limits
of its continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles, it shall submit particulars of such
limits to the Commission along with supporting scientific and technical data as soon as
possible but in any case within 10 years of the entry into force of this Convention for
that State.
Id. It is this ability to use the UNCLOS Treaty to solidify claims to off-shore oil resources on the
continental shelf that finally attracted the attention of the Bush Administration. For example, in
a November 3, 2008 speech given at the Berkeley School of Law, John Bellinger, Legal Advisor
to the State Department opined:
[UNCLOS] offers a coastal State the opportunity to maximize international recognition
and legal certainty with respect to the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles off-
shore. This is an especially valuable feature of the Convention right now, as it would
maximize legal certainty regarding U.S. rights to energy resources in vast offshore ar-
eas, including in areas that are likely to extend at least 600 miles north of Alaska.
John B. Bellinger III, Legal Advisor, U.S. Department of State, Remarks at the United States
and the Law of the Sea Convention, available at http://ilreports.blogspot.com/2008/11fbellinger-
united-states-and-law-of-sea.html.
81. The Commission is made up of twenty-one experts drawn based on equal geographic
representation from states that have ratified the UNCLOS. UNCLOS, supra note 75, Annex II,
art. 76. Because the United States has not ratified UNCLOS, it has no representation on the
Commission.
82. UNCLOS, supra note 75, Annex II.
83. Russia submitted its claim in 2001 and Norway submitted its claim in 2006. Press Re-
lease, Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea, Russian Federation First to Move to
Establish Outer Limits of Its Extended Continental Shelf (Dec., 21, 2001), available at http://
www.un.orglDepts/los/clcs-new/clcshome.htm;
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expansive coastal state jurisdiction, 4 these submissions will ultimately
result in international recognition of Arctic state sovereignty over sig-
nificant portions of the Arctic seabed, with the attendant sovereign
right to control exploitation of any mineral resources therein.85
These provisions of UNCLOS, along with the International Mari-
time Organization ("IMO")86 and the Arctic Council,87 form the core
of the regime that governs the Arctic.88 Under UNCLOS, states have
both the sovereign right to exploit mineral resources, 89 and the ex-
press duty to protect and preserve the marine environment.90 Read in
the context of the Arctic, these UNCLOS provisions are generally
viewed as giving the five nations that border the Arctic Ocean primary
responsibility for managing activities in the region, including both de-
velopment and environmental protection. An additional provision,
Article 234, which is particularly relevant to the Arctic, allows a
coastal state to impose special environmental protection regimes over
ice-covered waters, an issue of particular relevance for the Northwest
Passage.91
84. UNCLOS originally proposed that the mineral resources of the deep seabed be viewed
as the "common heritage" of humanity, with proceeds from their exploitation being distributed
on an equitable basis. UNCLOS, supra note 75, art. 136. However, unwavering United States
opposition and pressure has eroded this vision. See Agreement Relating to the Implementation
of Part XI of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982, July
28, 1994, 1836 U.N.T.S. 41.
85. Article 81 of UNCLOS provides: "The coastal State shall have the exclusive right to
authorize and regulate drilling on the continental shelf for all purposes." UNCLOS, supra note
75, art. 81.
86. Information about the International Maritime Organization, a UN specialized agency,
can be found at http://www.imo.org/.
87. Information about the Arctic Council can be found at http://www.arctic-council.org/.
The member states of the Arctic Council are Canada, the United States, Russia, Finland, Ice-
land, Sweden, and Norway. In addition, six indigenous groups have permanent participant
status.
88. This is true even though the United States, the leading maritime power, has not ratified
the UNCLOS. The United States accepts almost all of the treaty as customary law. See, e.g., Dan
Lickel, Regulating Foreign Vessels Under the Clean Air Act: The Case for a Permissible Adminis-
trative Interpretation, 3 SAN DIEGO INT'L L. J. 145, 154 n. 61 (2002) (listing the ways that United
States law reflects this position). Canada ratified the UNCLOS in 2003, Russia in 1997, Den-
mark in 2004, and Norway in 1996. See Table Recapitulating Status of the Law of the Sea and
Related Agreements, http://www.un.orgldepts/los/reference-files/status2008.pdf (last visited
Mar. 6, 2009).
89. UNCLOS, supra note 75, art. 193.
90. Id. art. 192.
91. Directed largely at appeasing Canadian worries about the Northwest Passage, Article
234 gives coastal states the authority to impose laws and regulations "for the prevention, reduc-
tion and control of marine pollution in ice-covered areas within the exclusive economic zone."
Id. art 234.
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In addition to these UNCLOS provisions, both the Rio Declara-
tion,92 and the Convention on Biological Diversity93 emphasize the
principle of sovereign control over resources. Thus, that the Law of
the Sea mediated discussion about sovereignty allocation between the
Arctic claimants is of critical importance to international environmen-
tal law.
As always, there is a central relationship between natural re-
sources, trade, and governance. There are questions about how these
environmental agreements should be coordinated with UNCLOS, and
whether UNCLOS creates a regime capable of safely managing the
exploitation of Arctic resources. One issue in particular is whether Ar-
ticle 192's recognition of sovereignty, when read in light of Article
193's duty to protect the environment, gives coastal states sufficient
tools and incentive to protect the Arctic's fragile environment. In re-
sponse, the five Arctic states issued the Ilulissat Declaration at the
conclusion of the 2008 Arctic Ocean Conference. The Declaration
proclaimed that:
The law of the sea provides for important rights and obligations
concerning the delineation of the outer limits of the continental
shelf, the protection of the marine environment, including ice-cov-
ered areas, freedom of navigation, marine scientific research, and
other uses of the sea.94
The Declaration continued that the five Arctic states "remain
committed to this legal framework and to the orderly settlement of
any possible overlapping claims."95 This language was intended to un-
derscore the fact that although newly accessible, the Arctic was al-
92. United Nations Conference on Environment and Development: Rio Declaration on En-
vironment and Development princ. 22, June 14, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 874, 880 [hereinafter Rio Decla-
ration]. Principle 22 provides:
Indigenous people and their communities, and other local communities, have a vital
role in environmental management and development because of their knowledge and
traditional practices. States should recognize and duly support their identity, culture
and interests and enable their effective participation in the achievement of sustainable
development.
93. United Nations Conference on Environment and Development: Convention on Biologi-
cal Diversity arts. 2, 8, June 5, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 818, 825 [hereinafter Convention on Biological
Diversity].
94. See THE ILULISSAT DECLARATION (Green. 2008), available at http://www.oceanlaw.org/
downloads/arctic/IlulissatDeclaration.pdf (last visited Feb. 23, 2009). Aqqaluk Lynge, President
of the Inuit Circumpolar Council, criticized this meeting because representatives of Inuit groups
were not full and equal partners in this negotiation over sovereignty in the Arctic. Aqqaluk
Lynge, President of the Inuit Circumpolar Council, Keynote Speech at the Sixth Annual Interna-
tional Arctic Social Sciences Association (Aug. 23, 2008) (transcript available at http://www.siku
news.com/img/siku/publish/2008/08/Aqqaluk-Speech-lCASS-23Aug08.doc).
95. THE ILULISSAT DECLARATION, supra note 94.
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ready governed by an extensive legal regime, and no new
international agreements were necessary.
Given the resources that have been devoted to developing a com-
prehensive international legal system to define sovereign rights to
Arctic resources, it is notable that the UNCLOS does not even men-
tion indigenous peoples. This omission strikes a jarring note of discord
with recent developments in international law affirming indigenous
rights to their territories and the resources contained therein. These
developments affirm that the fundamental right to own property, rec-
ognized in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 96 the Interna-
tional Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination,97 the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, 98 Protocol 1 of the European Convention on Human Rights99
and the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man,100
extends to indigenous claims to traditional territories.
IV. APPLICATION OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW TO
THE ARCTIC
As Canada's Minister of Foreign Affairs, Peter MacKay recently
pointed out, "this isn't 15th century."' 1 MacKay's statement was in
response to Russia's decision to plant a flag on the Arctic seabed, and
was intended to debunk the notion that any sovereignty claims flowed
96. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, at 74, art. 17, U.N. GAOR,
3d Sess., 1st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948), available at http://www. un.org/Over-
view/rights.html (declaring that everyone has the right to own property and no one shall be
arbitrarily deprived of his property).
97. International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination,
arts. 1, 5 Mar. 7, 1966, 659-60 U.N.T.S. 195 (recognizing that the right to property is both an
individual and a collective right).
98. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 1, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S.
171, available at http://www.ohchr.org/english/law/pdf/ccpr.pdf (declaring that all peoples have
the right to fully and freely utilize their natural wealth and resources as they deem appropriate
regardless of any international economic agreements). In Article 27, the ICCPR recognizes the
group right of minority populations to enjoy their own culture. The General Comments for
Article 27 make it clear that the drafters contemplated that groups might have lifestyles that
depend on a territory and the use of natural resources. Id. art. 27.
99. Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Free-
doms, art. 1, Mar. 20, 1952, 213 U.N.T.S. 262 (stating that "[e]very natural or legal person is
entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions.").
100. American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, O.A.S. Res. XXX, art. XXIII,
EA/Ser.LUV/I.4Rev (1948) (affirming the right of every person to "own such private property as
meets the essential needs of decent living and helps to maintain the dignity of the individual and
of the home.").
101. Russian Subs, supra note 1.
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from Russia's dramatic act. °2 MacKay was, of course, technically cor-
rect-six centuries separate the 21st century from the 15th century.
Unfortunately, some central portions of the notion of sovereignty em-
bodied by both the UNCLOS and ICJ decisions, a notion that is also
embodied in the Convention on Biological Diversity ("CBD"), remain
unchanged from its 15th century roots.
On May 4, 1493, two months after Columbus's historic return to
Europe, Pope Alexander VI issued his Papal Bull Caetera. 10 3 This
singular document purported to allocate possession of lands "not in-
habited by Christians" between Portugal and Spain.1 0 4 There was,
however, a fundamental problem with the Pope's grandiose gesture-
the lands in question were already inhabited.
To finesse this inconvenient fact, European colonizers developed
two interrelated legal fictions, the Doctrine of Discovery l05 and the
principle of terra nullius.10 6 In short, these doctrines held that the
kinds of land uses by so-called "native peoples" did not amount to
ownership and therefore did not create property rights that the
Europeans need respect.0 7 This principle allowed colonizers to ex-
102. Somewhat ironically, Canada has also engaged in some flag-planting posturing of its
own in an attempt to reinforce its sovereignty claims. In July 2008, Canadian soldiers planted the
Canadian flag over Hans Island, a tiny sliver of barren rock located between the Canadian terri-
tory of Ellesmere Island and the Danish territory of Greenland. Canada's Defense Minister Bill
Graham visited the island and proclaimed that it would "always remain Canadian." Denmark
registered an official protest because it has also planted its flag on Hans Island's inhospitable
ground. The diplomatic spat marks another chapter in the ongoing skirmish contesting owner-
ship of this sliver of land in the middle of the Arctic Nares Straits. For both nations, Hans Island
is a test case, and we can expect such territorial conflicts to become a lot more common north of
the Arctic Circle. See generally Christopher Stevenson, Hans Off: The Struggle for Hans Island
and the Potential Ramifications for International Border Dispute Resolution, 30 B.C. INT'L &
CoMp. L. REV. 263 (2007).
103. Pope Alexander VI, Papal Bull Dividing the New World (1493), in 1 AM. HISTORY TOLD
BY CONTEMPORARIES 40 (Albert Bushnell Hart ed., Richard Eden trans., 1555) (1902) (provid-
ing the text of this document in English).
104. Id. The Pope purported to grant the royal families of Spain "all and singular aforesaid
countries and islands ... hitherto discovered ... and to be discovered ... together with all their
dominions, cities, camps, places, villages, and all rights, jurisdictions, and appurtenances of the
same." Id. Read in light of earlier Papal issuances, this Bull granted Spain the Western Hemi-
sphere, while awarding the Eastern Hemisphere to Portugal. The Pope reached this result by
drawing an imaginary line from the Arctic Pole to the Antarctic Pole about one hundred leagues
to the west of the Cape Verde Islands.
105. In the United States, the definitive statement of this point is Johnson v. Mc'Intosh,
where Justice Marshall characterized the Piankeshaw claims to their land as "mere occupancy"
rather than ownership. Johnson 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 590 (1823).
106. Mabo v. Queensland II provides a detailed exposition of this theory and its lingering
effects. See Mabo v. Queensland 11 (1992) 175 C.L.R. 1 (Austl.).
107. The debate ran much deeper than just rights to land. For example, the Valladolid De-
bate of 1550 between Las Casas and Sepulveda wrestled with the very humanity of the occupants
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ploit lands in the "New World." Indigenous peoples were thereby dis-
possessed and stripped of the legal protections for their lands that
their non-indigenous neighbors routinely expected in their property.
We are still dealing with the ramifications of these doctrines. 10 8
That said, international law regarding sovereignty and indigenous
peoples has evolved significantly since the 15th century, and in ways
that may have a dramatic impact on questions of control over Arctic
resources. First and foremost, international law is not only about
states anymore. Individuals and groups can be actors under interna-
tional law, with rights that states must respect, and powers that can be
exercised in international arenas. Resolving the sovereignty question
vis-A-vis the state claimants does not speak to the international human
rights of individuals and groups, rights that treaties and customary
laws require states to respect. While domestic law is obviously rele-
vant on this point, international human rights law may be an impor-
tant platform for indigenous groups seeking access to, or control of,
Arctic resources.
Second, the very idea of sovereignty is far more nuanced today
than it was in the 15th century. A growing recognition of aboriginal
rights, both in international agreements and opinio juris, has forced a
rethinking of what sovereignty means. This rethinking might have im-
portant ramifications for the Arctic, particularly for those mineral
rights everyone is chasing and also for biodiversity. It may also lay the
groundwork for claims based on a right to ice and to cultural usage of
that ice, and may also give support to demands for environmental pro-
tection in the face of a shrinking, warming planet.10 9
of newly-discovered lands. See generally LEwis HANKE, THE SPANISH STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE IN
THE CONQUEST OF AMERICA 114-17 (2002) (describing, in the context of the legitimacy of wag-
ing war, whether the occupants of the "New World" were endowed with souls and the legitimacy
of waging war against them). That said, a central question in the Valladolid Debate was whether
the Indians had property rights that Spanish colonists had to respect. While Sepulveda argued
that the natives of the New World were not human, and therefore possessed no rights, de Las
Casas made the case that they were endowed with the same natural rights that all humans pos-
sess. Id.
108. See STUART BANNER, POSSESSING THE PACIFIC: LAND, SETTLERS AND INDIGENOUS
PEOPLE FROM AUSTRALIA TO ALASKA (2007) (providing a more thorough exploration of how
the early decisions about terra nullius still shape the discourse on indigenous rights).
109. In December of 2005, Inuit Circumpolar Conference Chair Sheila Watt-Cloutier filed a
Petition to the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights seeking relief from human rights
violations caused by the impacts the United States is having on global warming. Shelia Watt-
Cloutier, Chair, Inuit Circumpolar Conference, Petition to the Inter American Commission on
Human Rights Requesting Relief from Violations Resulting from Global Warming Caused by
Acts and Omissions of the United States (Dec. 7, 2005), http://www,inuitcircumpolar.comlfiles/
uploads/icc-files/FINALPetitionICC.pdf; see generally A Right to Frozen Water, supra note 49;
see generally Hari M. Osofsky, The Geography of Climate Change Litigation: Implications for
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In short, international human rights law and international envi-
ronmental law tell states how they must implement the sovereignty
over Arctic resources assigned to them by UNCLOS Articles 76 and
78. Consequently, this body of law offers Arctic peoples a seat at the
table when decisions are made.
V. INTERNATIONAL LAW DEVELOPMENTS
Recent groundbreaking developments in international law may
reshape how we think about indigenous rights in the Arctic. A series
of decisions handed down by international tribunals have recognized
indigenous claims to traditional territories under international law.11 °
At the same time, various state constitutional courts have recognized
indigenous claims under the common law."1 ' Sometimes these domes-
tic decisions rely explicitly on international law and the growing inter-
national consensus about indigenous rights."12  Even when these
domestic courts do not directly reference international law, they are
clearly participating in an ongoing multi-level transnational dialogue.
The theory of indigenous rights that is emerging from this dialogue
differs tremendously from the Doctrine of Discovery articulated in the
15th century or from terra nullius.
Transnational Regulatory Governance, 83 WASH. U. L.Q. 1789 (2005). (describing and analyzing
the Petition in-depth). The Petition alleges a host of violations including the right to property
and the right to life. See Donald Goldberg & Martin Wagner, Human Rights Litigation to Pro-
tect the Peoples of the Arctic, 98 AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. PROC. 227, 229 (2004).
110. E.g., The Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Cmty v. Nicaragua, 2001 Inter-Am. Ct. H. R.
(ser. C) No. 79, at 308 (Aug. 31, 2001); Mayan Indigenous Communities of the Toledo District v.
Belize Case 12.053, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 40/04, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.122, doc. 5 89 (2004)
[hereinafter Awas Tingni], available at http://cidh.org/annual report/2004eng/Belize.12053eng.
htm.
111. E.g., Sagong bin Tasi & Ors. v. Selangor & Ors, [2002] 2 MJL 591, 592 (Malaysia) (rec-
ognizing indigenous ownership of traditional lands); Adong bin Kuwau & Ors v. Kerajaan
Negeri Johor & Anor [1997] 1 MLJ 418, 432 (Malaysia) (interpreting the Malaysian constitu-
tional right to property as encompassing aboriginal rights); Delgamuukw v. British Columbia,
[1997] 3 S.C.R. 1010, 1016 (Can.) (finding that indigenous rights amounted to a "right in land"
rather than a usufructuary right).
112. E.g., Kerajaan Negeri Selangor & Ors v. Sagong Bin Tasi & Ors, [2002] M.L.J. 591, 592
(explicitly stating "to be in keeping with the worldwide recognition now being given to aborigi-
nal rights I conclude that the proprietary interest of the Orang Asli in their customary and ances-
tral lands is an interest in and to the land."). See also Cal v. Attorney General, Claim No. 171 of
2007, Judgment, Oct. 18, 2007, available at http://www.law.arizona.edu/depts/iplp/advocacy/maya
_belize (citing the Declaration of the Rights of Indigenous Peoples); Nor Anak Nyawai & Ors v.
Borneo Pulp Plantation Sdn Bhd & Ors, [2001] 6 M.J.S. 241, 294 (citing the then-Draft Declara-
tion of the Rights of Indigenous Peoples as evidence of a "global attitude toward native
[populations]").
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A. International Jurisprudence
Questions of indigenous rights under international law have in-
creasingly found their way to international tribunals. The Interna-
tional Court of Justice led the way with its Advisory Opinion on
Western Sahara, in which it rejected the doctrine of terra nullius.113
The Inter-American Court of Human Rights has followed suit, decid-
ing a series of landmark decisions that articulate how international
law views indigenous rights to land and resources.
The most important of these decisions, Mayagna (Sumo) Awas
Tingni Cmty v. Nicaragua, was decided in 2001.114 Brought under Ar-
ticle 21 of the American Convention on Human Rights," 5 this case
asserted that Nicaragua violated the Awas Tingni's right to property
by granting timber concessions in the Awas Tingi's traditional territo-
ries. l1 6 The suit alleged that Nicaragua's granting of timber conces-
sions violated Article 21 of the American Convention." 7 In finding
for the Awas Tingni, the Inter-American Court relied on an "evolu-
tionary interpretation" of human rights to construe Article 21 as en-
compassing the rights of indigenous communities that hold their
property communally. 1 8 The court stated, "the close ties of indige-
nous people with their land must be recognized and understood at the
fundamental basis of their cultures, their spiritual life, their integrity
and their economic survival."" 9 In reaching this result, the court
made it clear that customary practices and also possession suffice for
indigenous communities to establish ownership that states must
recognize. 2 °
Subsequent decisions of the Inter-American Court have affirmed
and further developed these points. In 2002, the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights affirmed that states must respect tradi-
113. Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion, 1975 I.C.J. 12, 38-39.
114. Awas Tingni, supra note 110.
115. American Convention on Human Rights: "Pact of San Jose, Costa Rica" art. 21, Nov.
22, 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123 [hereinafter American Convention on Human Rights].
116. Awas Tingni, supra note 110, 3.
117. Article 21 declares that "Everyone has the right to the use and enjoyment of his [sic]
property.... No one shall be deprived of his property except upon payment of just compensa-
tion." American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 115, art. 21.
118. Awas Tingni, supra note 110, 148.
119. Id. 149.
120. See generally id. The United Nations Human Rights Committee has reached very simi-
lar results by interpreting Article 27 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
which guarantees minorities the right to "enjoy their own culture." International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, supra note 98, art. 27. See generally Human Rights Committee, Chief
Ominayak and Lubicon Lake Band v. Canada, Comm. No. 167/1984, U.N. Doc. Supp. No. 40 (Al
45/40) at 1 (Mar. 26, 1990).
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tional indigenous land claims in a case brought by Carrie and Mary
Dann.121 As members of the Western Shoshone Tribe, the Dann sis-
ters had for years tried to assert traditional land rights against the
United States.' 22  After domestic avenues of relief were closed to
them, the Dann sisters petitioned the Inter-American Commission al-
leging that their right to property was violated.'23 In a far-reaching
decision, the Commission concluded that the United States had failed
"to ensure the Dann's right to property under conditions of equality"
through the process by which it appropriated Western Shoshone an-
cestral lands.'2 4 Ultimately the Dann sisters appealed to the United
Nations Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination
("CERD") to persuade the United States to recognize and abide by
the Commission's decision and to cease violating their indigenous land
rights.125 Using extremely direct language rarely found in diplomatic
writings, CERD urged the United States to "freeze," "desist" and"stop" threatening or imminent actions against the Western Shoshone
People.'26 By this action, CERD affirmed the Inter-American Com-
mission's interpretation of international law concerning indigenous
peoples.
Most recently, in a case involving Belize's Maya Communities, 27
the Inter-American Commission used the Awas Tingni rationale to
find that the Belize government violated the complaining Mayan com-
munities' rights when it licensed logging and mineral extraction on
121. Mary and Carrie Dann v. United States, Case 11.140, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 75/
02, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.117, doc. 1 rev. 173 (2002) [hereinafter Dann Case], available at http://
cidh.org/annualrep/2002engfUSA.11140.htm.
122. The Dann litigation has a tortuous history. The Inter-American Commission decision
has a relatively thorough explanation. See generally The Western Shoshone Defense Project,
http://www.wsdp.org/ilrcpr.htm (last visited Feb. 23, 2009); The University of Arizona James E.
Rogers College of Law Indigenous Peoples Law & Policy Program, http://www.law.arizona.edu/
depts/iplp/advocacy/shoshone/index.cfm?page=advoc (last visited Feb. 23, 2009) (providing addi-
tional information and background).
123. Because the United States is not a party to the American Convention on Human
Rights, the plaintiffs alleged a violation of Article 23 of the American Declaration of the Rights
and Duties of Man. Dann Case, supra note 121, 2. Although the Declaration itself is not an
enforceable legal document, the Commission views it as the articulation of the duties states ac-
cept when they become members of the Organization of American States. See American Decla-
ration of the Rights and Duties of Man, supra note 100. The Universal Declaration of Human
Rights occupies a similar status with regard to membership in the United Nations. See Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 96.
124. Dann Case, supra note 121, at 172.
125. U.N. Comm. on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Decision 1(68): Early Warn-
ing and Urgent Action Procedure, CERD/C/472/Add.1 1 (2006).
126. Id. 1 10.
127. Awas Tingni, supra note 110, 1$ 134-44.
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traditional Mayan lands. In reaching this conclusion, the Commission
interpreted both Belizean domestic law and Belize's obligations under
international law. The Commission found that the traditional land
rights asserted by the petitioners had "autonomous meaning and foun-
dation under international law.' 1 28 As a consequence, the Commis-
sion concluded that the asserted property rights were "not dependent
upon particular interpretations of domestic judicial decisions concern-
ing the possible existence of aboriginal rights under common law.' '1 29
In this decision, the Commission articulated the clearest vision yet of a
free-standing international obligation toward indigenous peoples in
making resource management decisions that affect their traditional
land rights. As set out in this opinion, this international legal obliga-
tion applies to all states, regardless of domestic law.
These cases set out clear state obligations vis-A-vis recognizing in-
digenous claims to land, and respecting those claims in making re-
source management decisions. This jurisprudence from the Inter-
American Court and Commission has clear ramifications for Arctic
peoples as they struggle to have their right to participate in resource
management decisions.
B. Declaration of Rights of Indigenous Peoples
On July 29, 2006, the United Nations Human Rights Council
adopted the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples and rec-
ommended its adoption by the General Assembly. 1 ° After deferring
adoption to "allow more time for further consultation,"'' the General
Assembly ultimately adopted the Declaration on September 13,
2007.132
Several key provisions of the 2007 Indigenous Rights Declaration
speak directly to resource use and allocation questions that will be
raised as global warming makes the Arctic more accessible to the rest
of the world. Article 3 of the Declaration explicitly affirms that the
international human right of self-determination extends to indigenous
128. Id. 131.
129. Id.
130. The vote was thirty in favor, two opposed (Canada and the Russian Federation) with
twelve abstentions. See H.R.C. Res. 2006/2, U.N. Doc. AHRC/RES/1/2 (June 29, 2006).
131. Press Release, U.N. General Assembly, Concluding Consideration of Third Committee
Reports, General Assembly Adopts Convention on Enforced Disappearance, U.N. Doc GA/
10563 (Dec. 20, 2006), available at http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2006/ga10563.doc.htm.
132. United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, G.A. Res. 61/295,
Annex, U.N. Doc. A/RES/61/295 (Sept. 13, 2007), available at http://www2.ohchr.org/english/
issues/indigenous/declaration.htm [hereinafter Indigenous Rights Declaration].
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peoples. 133 At the same time, Article 23 explicitly affirms that the in-
ternational human right to development also extends to indigenous
groups. 13 Finally, Article 32 underscores this right to control resource
management decisions by calling on states to obtain prior informed
consent from indigenous groups before enacting new laws or adminis-
trative measures. 135
Because these provisions of the Declaration make it clear that
two international human rights at the center of the international envi-
ronmental law and development discourse-self-determination and
development-rest with indigenous peoples for their territories, indig-
enous peoples have a right to control the exercise of those rights
within their territories. 136 In addition, Article 10 of the Declaration
prohibits forced removals of indigenous peoples from their traditional
territories, 37 and Article 26 recognizes that indigenous people have
the right to their traditional lands and resources. 138
Versions of some of the key provisions in the Indigenous Rights
Declaration are rooted in the International Labor Organization
("ILO") Convention 169 on Indigenous and Tribal Peoples. 139 ILO
Convention 169 was the first legally-binding recognition of many in-
digenous rights, including: indigenous peoples' land rights 4 ° and cul-
133. See id. art. 3 ("Indigenous peoples have the right to self-determination. By virtue of that
right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and
cultural development.").
134. Id. art. 23. Article 23 states,
Indigenous peoples have the right to determine and develop priorities and strategies
for exercising their right to development. In particular, indigenous peoples have the
right to be actively involved in developing and determining health, housing and other
economic and social programmes affecting them and, as far as possible, to administer
such programmes through their own institutions.
Id.
135. Id. art. 32. Article 32 states,
Indigenous peoples have the right to determine and develop priorities and strategies
for the development or use of their lands or territories and other resources. States shall
consult and cooperate in good faith with the indigenous peoples concerned ... in order
to obtain their free and informed consent prior to the approval of any project affecting
their lands or territories and other resources ....
Id.
136. See id.
137. Indigenous Rights Declaration, supra note 132, art. 10 ("Indigenous peoples shall not be
forcibly removed from their lands or territories. No relocation shall take place without the free,
prior and informed consent of the indigenous peoples concerned and after agreement on just
and fair compensation and, where possible, with the option of return.").
138. Id. art. 26 ("Indigenous peoples have the right to the lands, territories and resources
which they have traditionally owned, occupied or otherwise used or acquired.").
139. International Labor Organization Convention 169 Concerning Indigenous & Tribal
Peoples in Independent Countries, Sept. 5, 1991, 72 ILO Official Bull 59, available at http://www.
unhchr.ch/html/menu3b/62.htm.
140. Id. arts. 13-15.
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tural rights. 4 ' While ILO Convention 169 did not explicitly recognize
the sovereignty rights of indigenous peoples, it did to a certain extent
recognize rights of self-governance. 142 Unfortunately, although ILO
Convention 169 was negotiated in 1989, and entered into force in
1991, as of 2008 it had only twenty ratifications.'43 In what will be-
come a familiar pattern, the United States, Canada, and Russia are
not parties, but Norway and Denmark are. Despite the relatively lim-
ited participation, the Convention has become an influential bench-
mark for the basic rights of indigenous peoples. It is often considered
to "set the tone internationally" particularly for international agencies
making decisions that affect indigenous rights. 44
The Indigenous Rights Declaration clearly goes much further
than the ILO Convention 169 in protecting indigenous rights. Read-
ing its provisions together, the Declaration explicitly recognizes that
indigenous peoples have legally protected rights, arising from their
traditional use and occupancy of land, that entitle them to participate
in resource management decisions on or affecting their territories. To-
gether, these rights make a powerful frame for ensuring that indige-
nous interests are included in decision-making and indigenous
participants are at the table when decisions are made.
The catch, of course, is that under international law, Declarations
of the General Assembly are not legally binding. Nevertheless, such
Declarations can be profoundly influential, as the Universal Declara-
tion of Human Rights shows. Since the United Nations characterizes
the Indigenous Rights Declaration as "represent[ing] the dynamic de-
velopment of international legal norms and reflect[ing] the commit-
ment of the UN's member states to move in certain directions,"' 45 the
Declaration is likely to be very influential in the ongoing international
dialogue on this point.
Nevertheless, the status of this Declaration remains ambiguous.
Like the ILO Convention 169, three of the key Arctic states-the
United States, Russia, and Canada-are not signatories to the Decla-
ration, a46 but Denmark and Norway are. The General Assembly does
141. Id. arts. 5, 7, 27.
142. Id. arts. 8-9, 17.
143. See generally Ratification of International Labor Organization Convention No. 169,
http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/cgi-lex/ratifce.pl?C169 (last visited Mar. 6, 2009).
144. See, e.g., ANAYA, supra 14, at 47-58.
145. UNITED NATIONS PERMANENT FORUM ON INDIGENOUS ISSUES, FREQUENTLY ASKED
QUESTIONS: DECLARATION ON THE RIGHTS OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES, http://www.un.org/esa/
socdev/unpfii/documents/FAQsindigenousdeclaration.pdf (last visited Mar. 9, 2009).
146. The vote was 143 in favor, four against, with eleven abstentions. The Arctic states had a
wide range of positions. Canada and the United States voted against the Declaration (along with
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not have the power to bind states by issuing a Declaration. There is, of
course, the argument that the Declaration has legal force because it
codifies customary international law on indigenous rights.' 4 7 This
claim has some force in light of the jurisprudence coming from the
Inter-American Court of Human Rights and the domestic jurispru-
dence discussed below. 148 But, Canada has already stated that it does
not view the Declaration as customary international law149 and Aus-
tralia similarly signaled that the Declaration is not legally enforcea-
ble.15° The United States will likely follow suit.
Nevertheless, this diplomatic initiative, coupled with interna-
tional jurisprudential developments, is surely indicative of how inter-
national bodies view international law. Even if not technically
enforceable, these developments are an important representation-a
taking of the international temperature-that may profoundly influ-
ence states as they begin to consider what sovereignty over newly-
accessible Arctic resources should look like.
VI. DOMESTIC LEGAL DEVELOPMENTS
The Indigenous Rights Declaration and the growing body of in-
ternational jurisprudence are accompanied by a worldwide shift in do-
mestic legal jurisprudence on indigenous rights. As courts around the
world grapple with the lasting consequences of colonialism, they are
Australia and New Zealand); Norway and Denmark were among the Declaration's co-sponsors,
and Russia abstained. Clive Tesar, Arctic States Split on UN Declaration on Rights of Indigenous
Peoples, ARCTIC PEOPLES, September 13, 2007, http://www.arcticpeoples.org/2007/09/13/arctic-
states-split-on-un-declaration-on-rights-of-indigenous-peoples (last visited Mar. 9, 2009).
147. Under international law, custom is a source of binding law. See Statute of the Interna-
tional Court of Justice art. 38(1)(b), June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055. The vigorous scholarly debate
about customary international law is beyond the scope of this essay.
148. See Awas Tingni, supra note 110; Dann Case, supra note 121; Toledo District, supra
note 17; see also Case of the Saramaka People v. Suriname, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 172
(Nov. 28, 2007), available at http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/seriec_172-ing.pdf
(although this decision involved a minority tribal population that was not indigenous, the reason-
ing of this case tracks and expands the reasoning the court has previously articulated in the
context of indigenous peoples).
149. Update Paper: United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, INDIAN
AND NORTHERN AFFAIRS CANADA, Jan. 10, 2008, http://www.ainc-inac.gc.ca/ap/ia/pubs/updir/
updir-eng.asp (last visited Mar. 9, 2009). See also, Press Release, General Assembly, General
Assembly Adopts Declaration on Rights of Indigenous Peoples: Major Step Forward Toward
Human Rights for All, Says President, GAJ10612 (Sept. 13, 2007), available at http://www.un.org/
NewsfPress/docs/2007/gal0612.doc.htm (comments of Canadian Ambassador John McNee)
[hereinafter Major Step] (stating that "[t]he [Canadian] Government understood the Declara-
tion was not legally binding and had no legal effect in Canada.").
150. Major Step, supra note 149. (comments of Australian Representative Robert Hill, as-
serting that "it was the clear intention of all States that [the Declaration] be an aspirational
Declaration with political and moral force, but not legal force.").
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rethinking the historic legal assumption of terra nullius that too often
governed treatment of indigenous peoples. 151 The Australian Mabo
case has been the most influential. 15 2 In Mabo, the Australian High
Court explicitly repudiated the doctrine of terra nullius and instead
ruled that Australia's aborigines had rights that survived British
colonization. 153
The Mabo decision sparked a transnational jurisprudential dia-
logue about the relationship between pre-existing indigenous property
rights and the state. Courts in Malaysia, 54 Canada, 155 and Belize 5 6
discussed the Mabo court ruling as they grappled with how to address
indigenous claims under their respective legal systems. These cases,
individually and collectively, represent a thorough repudiation of the
doctrine of terra nullius in favor of recognizing indigenous claims to
communal property and the attendant mineral rights.
The 2007 Cal decision from the Belize Supreme Court is particu-
larly noteworthy. Brought by a Mayan group demanding that Belizean
law recognize their traditional land rights, the court's decision
squarely addresses the question of the interplay between domestic, in-
ternational, and foreign law on this question. The Cal court explicitly
drew on the transnational dialogue, international jurisprudence, and
the Indigenous Rights Declaration as resources to help it interpret the
Mayan claim under Belizean law. Citing Mabo, Delgamuukw, Awas-
Tingni, the Dann Case, and the Declaration, inter alia, Chief Justice
Conteh explicitly recognized an international legal consensus about
indigenous rights.
Although his ruling rested primarily on his interpretation of the
Belizean Constitution, Justice Conteh explicitly used both Belize's in-
ternational treaty obligations and customary international law to in-
terpret the scope of the rights of indigenous peoples to their lands and
151. See Calder v. Attorney-General of British Columbia [1973] S.C.R. 313, 416 (Can.) (re-
jecting the proposition that indigenous peoples had no rights that survived conquest as "wholly
wrong"); Mabo v. Queensland 11 (1992) 175 C.L.R. 1, 42 (rejecting terra nullius as contrary to
international standards and common law); Delgamuukw v. British Columbia, [1997] 3. S.C.R.
1010 (Can.); Sagong Bin Tasi & Ors, 2 M.L.J. at 615 (relying on Mabo to reject terra nullius); Cal
v. Attorney General, Claim No. 171 of 2007 (Belize), available at http://www.law.afizona.edu/
depts/iplp/advocacy/maya-belize (follow "landmark decision" hyperlink).
152. See Mabo v. Queensland 11 (1992) 175 C.L.R. 1.
153. Id. at 42, 76.
154. Sagong Bin Tasi & Ors, 2 M.L.J. at 615 (citing Mabo as authority for the proposition
that terra nullius is contrary to both international law and common law).
155. Delgamuukw v. British Columbia, [1997] 3. S.C.R. 1010 (Can.)
156. Cal v. Attorney General, Claim No. 171 of 2007 77, 81, 92.
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resources.1 57 After discussing how Belize's membership in various
treaties obligated the government to respect indigenous land rights, he
went on to say, "Treaty obligations aside, it is my considered view that
both customary international law and general principles of interna-
tional law would require that Belize respect the rights of its indige-
nous people to their lands and resources. "158
Thus, the Cal decision marks a significant step forward in recog-
nizing that, even within domestic legal systems, indigenous claims to
property and other rights must be shaped by the international dia-
logue on these matters.
Together these developments represent the emergence of a grow-
ing consensus about what is legitimate vis-A-vis indigenous peoples
and their rights to lands and resources. The contours of this consensus
are still emerging but it represents a real opportunity to do things
differently.
Rather than an Arctic race-a no-holds-barred rush for wealth
and resources that destabilizes the region and enriches stakeholders
outside the Arctic at the expense of its indigenous peoples-we have
the possibility of stable and inclusive governance that allows responsi-
ble development while preserving Arctic ecosystems and cultures. The
robust international and transnational law conversation about human
rights and indigenous peoples suggests that this alternative future is at
least possible.
VII. CONCLUSION
It is clear that the Arctic is "in the midst of a transformation we
do not understand."' 59 We are at a crisis point-a point of change.
Nevertheless, the underlying issues of justice and equitable access to
resources are familiar-they are the same questions that have plagued
the world since the 15th century.
157. Id. T 126. Paragraph 129 states,
Belize's international obligation towards indigenous peoples, therefore weighed heavily
with me in this case in interpreting the fundamental human rights provisions of the
Constitution agitated by the cluster of issues raised, particularly, the rights to property,
life, security of the person, the protection of the law and the right not to be discrimi-
nated against.
Id.
158. Id. T 127.
159. Tom Henry, BGSU Symposium: Warming Arctic Could Heat Up New Cold War. Rising
Value of Land, Water Leads to Boundary Disputes, TOLEDO BLADE, Jan. 20, 2008, available at
http://www.toledoblade.com/apps/pbcs.dii/article?AID=/20080120[NEWS21/801200374/-l/
NEWS (quoting Rob Huebert).
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While the questions may be the same, the answers to those ques-
tions have changed profoundly over time. From an embrace of terra
nullius, international law has moved toward a recognition of indige-
nous rights that includes a claim to resources on their traditional lands
and to consultation before decisions are made. This transformation
has also accelerated over the past decade.
As a result, decisions about resources will be made in a legal envi-
ronment that is worlds apart from the regime that existed before, even
in the relatively recent past. Asserting sovereignty in the Arctic can-
not just be a question for the United Nations Convention on the Law
of the Sea. International recognition of national sovereignty over
those coveted Arctic mineral resources is intimately entwined with a
concomitant recognition of indigenous self-determination, the princi-
ples of advanced informed consent, and an expanded consideration of
the right to property and to a wholesome environment.
International human rights law gives us some tools to do this.
The evolving body of law concerning indigenous rights recognizes
their rights to be part of the discussion about the future of the Arctic.
It creates a shared understanding of the relationship between States
and First Nations, and requires at a minimum consultation, and more
likely participation of First Nations in resource decisions. So, in many
ways, the changes wrought by global warming have become the testing
point for how and whether the international legal process for recog-
nizing sovereignty will be informed by international human rights
norms. There is more at stake than the Arctic. The answer will also
tell us much about the cherished belief that international law offers a
vehicle of progress toward a better world. 6 °
Thus, the developing human rights jurisprudence may translate
into a better, more just, more environmentally responsible process for
deciding the fate of Arctic resources. The robust international and
transnational legal conversation about human rights and indigenous
rights makes this alternative future possible. We can make choices
that translate this body of law into actions that shape a different path
for the Arctic. Two-thirds of the way through the International Polar
Year, that is worth remembering.
160. For a thorough exploration of this point, see PROGRESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (Re-
becca M. Bratspies & Russell A. Miller eds., 2008); David Kennedy, When Renewal Repeats:
Thinking Against the Box, 32 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 335, 337 (2000); see also ANLEY 0.
HUDSON, PROGRESS IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION (Graham H. Stuart ed., 1941) (1932).
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